The QDR, Whispers, & Cliches

Summary
As the calendar shifts into 2009’s back half, it is important to develop a better understanding of the upcoming Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). While the QDR’s primary purpose is to guide defense posturing with a 20 year horizon, the budget allegations get the most attention. Because these budget implications have such immediate inferences for states with large defense spending, it vital that policy makers and legislators stay focused on long-term strategy. QDR authors must insulate themselves from the vocal opinions of outside parties and the well-documented cliché about fighting the last war. Any manipulation of strategy decisions purely for the purpose of current weapon platform expenditures not only hinders the academic process; but also, hurts future U.S. security.

The Basics About the QDR
It can be argued that the Quadrennial Defense Review is one of the most important documents generated on Capitol Hill. Considering the percent of discretionary spending dedicated to defense spending, and the impact a military force structure has on the ability for a U.S. president to implement foreign policy goals, this seemingly benign document carries significant implications.

On paper, the purpose of the QDR is straight forward. It was first produced in 1996 after then-SecDef Les Aspin saw a need to create a planning and guiding document after the fall of the Soviet Union. Up to that point, such a creative exercise would have been considered unnecessary as the direction of foreign policy had been evident for over 5 decades. Congress agreed and requested the QDR through its incorporation into Title 10, the code in the U.S. law outlining the role of the armed forces.

The Cliché That Alters Bullets
Since the beginning of the War on Terror, the U.S. has continued the long tradition of upholding the cliché that governments and militaries constantly try to fight future wars by preparing against the last one. The Iraqi War began down that path in 2003 before a neutered 2006 Bush Administration finally allowed military leaders to refocus mission efforts. The newfound freedoms for CENTCOM leaders enabled them to better apply counterinsurgency doctrine and break away from the truism. However, while field-level leadership broke the paradigm on one warfront, the potency of this historical pattern of military spending and preparing is far from dead.

The cliché is happening even today in Afghanistan as U.S. field commanders are just now realizing the insurgency is very different than what was seen in Iraq. This conscious realization about warfare is important for the U.S. to succeed in Afghanistan. However, it is equally important that defense leaders and elected officials realize the trappings of trying to structure a military from the lessons learned of the last war. Doing so risks disregarding the guiding principles of long-range strategy and foreign policy. It is in this framework that Geopolitical Thoughts hopes those directly involved in the 2010 QDR discount the constant whispering from interested parties. This includes properly filtering the dialogue generated from combatant commanders, as powerful as their collective voice may be.

The QDR Turns Political
The QDR and its final report to Congress has quickly become a document with such far-reaching implications that its purpose now seems muddled. It is important to understand what the QDR is and what it isn’t. The QDR is congressionally mandated. The study is lead by the Department of Defense. Its assessments are to specifically drive the U.S.’s “national defense strategy, force structure, force modernization plans, infrastructure, budget plan, and other elements of the defense program and policies of the United States with a view toward determining and expressing the defense strategy of the United States and establishing a defense program for the next 20 years.” That is the official company line.

What isn’t the company line, nor should be, is anything pushing political opinions. Unfortunately, in short order from its origins the document has become just that. A cursory review from the previous report reveals such political overtures:

Since the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, our nation has fought a global war against violent extremists who use terrorism as their weapon of choice, and who seek to destroy our free way of life. Our enemies seek weapons of mass destruction and, if they are successful, will likely attempt to use them in their conflict with free people everywhere. Currently, the struggle is centered in Iraq and Afghanistan, but we will need to be prepared and arranged to successfully defend our nation and its interests around the globe for years to come.

From this opening salvo, a strong rhetoric becomes evident. The rationale for inserting phrases as magnanimous as “terrorism [is the] weapon of choice,” and “[they will] attempt to use [WMD’s against] free people everywhere.” can only be answered by those who wrote the document’s final draft. However, such an example sheds light on the influence political and monetary motives can have on the QDR.. Turning philosophical debates about foreign threats into fact is academically misleading, at best; serving a political purpose at worst. More specifically, by focusing Congress on the present conflicts instead of longer-term security doctrine it becomes easier to influence the budget process for preferred weapons platforms.

Only About the Here-and-Now
Another risk to creating a proper QDR comes from current military operations. While the perspective of what field commanders need for current military success is important for current defense spending, it inadvertently skews the process. Placing too much weight on immediate military requirements only perpetuates the “last war” cliché. The actions and opinions of senior military leaders is powerful. Regrettably, their voices too easily become a mea culpa for politicians when pushing for large defense expenditures as well as policy makers with ulterior motives. The risk this impact has is that current war efforts excessively effects future military structure. The debate within the halls of the Pentagon already reveals the sway such voices carry towards a push to mirror the future force towards today’s needs.

As Frank Hoffman points out in the this month’s Armed Forces Journal, significant changes about the perception of future threats as a result of post-9/11 military operations is already happening. Senior military and agency leaders involved in the 2010 QDR have fallen into multiple camps arguing for varying degrees of focus on Middle East forms of counterinsurgency for the future U.S. military structure. Yielding too far to the counterinsurgent’s camp could be a vicious false step. As Hoffman highlights:

“The current bifurcation of the spectrum of conflict between irregular and conventional wars is a false choice and intellectually blinds us to a number of crucial issues. We need to assess our assumptions about frequency, consequences and risk far more carefully and analytically. The QDR’s options are not simply preparing for long-term counterinsurgency operations or high-intensity conflict. We must be able to do both and do them simultaneously against enemies far more ruthless than today’s.”

Conclusion
The Pentagon has just concluded Phase 1 consisting of ‘issue team’ work. The process now enters the final months of workgroups and issue integration that comprises Phase 2 before the Secretary of Defense presents the final product to Congress in February 2010. During this homestretch when concepts are placed on paper, it is vital that policy makers and those involved at the advisory work group level maintain a long-term strategic perspective and not be too influenced by current operations. The distractions of a tried-and-true cliché as well as the opinions of third parties will weight heavy on the process. Policy makers and legislators must keep focused on the massive challenge presented to them and not allow these outside influences to distract. Failing to do so risks turning the strategically-vital academic process into a political exercise. Worse, any deviation from a long-term focus on foreign and defense policy could drastically impact future national security.