The North Korea Conundrum: An Unusual Diplomatic Approach to a Persistent Problem

Summary:
Like most of the developed world, Geopolitical Thoughts was rather surprised by the recent actions of hostility out of Pyongyang. While chalking up North Korea’s aggressive overtures to the dictator’s instability seems like an over-simplification to the problem, it might provide the most logical direction towards an untraditional approach. With that in mind, it is Geopolitical Thoughts’ opinion that not only is Jong-il’s mental instability the biggest underlying reason for the country’s acts; but also, it is this very underpinning that should dictate the United State’s response. The less-than-traditional line of thinking, however, is that the process yield’s an unpredictable outcome: that the U.S. response should be very minor, if any.

A Historical Refresher:
When discussing North Korean-U.S. relations, it is important to briefly consider the past 15 years. This duration encompasses Kim Jong-il’s reign following his father’s death in 1994. Prior to that time, the Korean Peninsula had been relatively calm since the end of the Korean War. However, what at first seemed like a new leader willing to work with the U.S.-led international community quickly unraveled into a decade-plus span of deceit and conflict. This line of deception started as soon as Jong-il agreed to freeze their nuclear program in exchange for $5 billion of free fuel and two nuclear reactors, to which Jong-il immediately returned towards the pursuit of nuclear weaponry.

Now, two U.S. president’s later, policy experts are still trying to understand how the Clinton Administration’s approach to North Korea failed so badly. Yet hindsight is 20-20, and only now is it evident that a carrot-and-stick approach layering in economic incentives does not lead to any transparency or honesty out of Pyongyang. Direct negotiations has only led to direct deception. By the time the Bush Administration took the reins of foreign policy, the prevailing wisdom was the U.S. would not allow another chance for North Korea to make the U.S. look foolish or naïve. Enter into the equation six-party negotiations. Without delving into the reasons for this drastic shift in diplomatic approach, it is now fair to say that multi-party diplomacy resulted in the same end-state, only this time China, Japan, and Russia can now be considered amongst the family-members fools. (It is fair to openly discuss China’s vested interest in the process, but that is a separate discussion.) In the meantime, not much has changed. North Korea remains a closed society that is failing economically with the same fanatical dictator willing to sacrifice the country’s very existence through extreme demonstrations of power and threats. This trial-and-error method of diplomacy by the U.S. has produced no good results, and forced policy makers to scramble for the next course of action. However, this is where Geopolitical Thoughts believes the policy planners must make one vital change to the basic assumptions about North Korea: traditional foreign policy does not succeed when the counterparty is not rational.

Making New Perspectives on Old News:
Establishing a baseline assumption that Kim Jong-il is not rational is rather easy. Aside from the connection of dots made by any examination of the person, a more revealing portrait develops when looking at the same news reels from a different psychological perspective. The thought of pursuing this approach first surfaced after Geopolitical Thoughts read the points made by Mark Landler in a NY Times article about the Korean situation. However, if a picture is worth a thousand words, then a more damning conclusion can be made by gazing upon some recent photos from this dictatorship. Not only is it more obvious that Kim Jong-il is in ill-health, but the country might be closer to collapse than even Western experts realize. Jong-il masterfully fills a movie character description of an lunatic who only cares about his legacy and family lineage. This need for adulation is strong, and possibly a driving force behind external actions. The country runs propaganda on state-run television citing legends of Jong-il’s immortality. One example is of Jong-il, someone who disdains golf, having hit a hole-in-one on his first-ever tee shot at the country’s only pro-level golf course. Conversely, dissidents describe Jong-il as an illiterate man who is not of all his faculties after a stroke last year. The intelligence community has spoken of an aging individual so consumed with insuring his power is transferred to his youngest son and that his legacy is carried forward into eternity that he is willing say or do anything to instill internal fear against potential domestic threats. Through this lens, the recent missile launches and underground nuclear tests might actually be an internal show of strength and nothing more. Instead of a real threat to the region, these acts may actually be those of a desperate man acting out as fear overcomes him.

Further data points only further validate this odd claim. Curtis Melvin and others have started to peel back the veil of this isolated nation. His work and imagery point towards the same conclusion. Word that Jong-il remains skeptical of his once-banished brother-in-law, Jang Song Taek. Jong-il doesn’t even have faith in his two middle sons. Incorporating the perspectives from basic psychology into an interdisciplinary approach validates the argument that Kim Jong-il, and by default, North Korea, is irrational. This means that this particular nation state is impervious to traditional diplomatic approaches. Therefore, the best foreign policy option for the U.S. might be to do nothing at all.

A New Policy Approach: A Road Never Taken:
Arguing that the United States do nothing, or next to nothing, might seem as irrational as Kim Jong-il is. However, there is merit to migrating towards the isolationism end of the foreign policy spectrum with North Korea so long as it is interlaced into a broader regional strategy. It encourages more international support, which will be well received in international circles. Moreover, it forces China and Russia to get off the ambiguous fence on which they have sat within the U.N. National Security Council. This makes China a more vested partner in international peace, and can serve as a signal to them and Russia that the U.S. respects their ability to police their backyard.

The time might be ripe for such a drastic shift in policy towards the Pacific Asian region. This concept would have been impossible 15 years ago when the Clinton Administration was forced into the fold as Russia was in a de-Soviet-Unionizing mess and China had barely moved past the 1989 Tiananmen Square uprising. The idea might not have even been possible in 2003 when the Bush Administration first engaged in six-party talks. China’s massive move into a global economic leadership position was just in the proverbial first inning. Meanwhile Russia was not yet swimming in cash from the commodity bubble as crude had just crossed $40 a barrel for the first time since the early 1980’s. However, much has changed. For the first time, more parties seem willing to take a leadership role.

China has been abnormally outspoken against North Korea’s actions. Furthermore, China has made strong signals in the past few weeks that reveal a greater desire to be an integral player in the global community, not just from an economic perspective; but also from a proactive leadership role. The effects of gradual globalization and capitalistic ventures might have finally pushed China past the tipping point to where they now realize it is no longer fiscally prudent for them to placate an aggressive nation like North Korea just for the sake of acting defiant on the U.N. Security Council. Even other nations in the region are stepping up to the plate more. For the first time in nearly a generation, South Korea is pushing back. This affords the United States a rare opportunity to be supportive of others, much like a caring older sibling, without having to risk much politically. By merely letting China, South Korea and others know that the U.S. is willing and ready to come to anyone’s aide if need be, the U.S. can finally sit on the fence for a change. The derivative effect of proxy diplomacy is it also provides the U.S. a chance to resume a position of moral leadership without risking the need to use the proverbial big stick.

Conclusion:
A “Do Nothing” policy doesn’t seem like the most logical strategy for the U.S. to pursue when weighing the North Korean situation. On the surface, it doesn’t seem like much of a strategy at all. However, it might just be the new approach that resonates best with the other players in the region who will welcome the symbolic gesture that the U.S. is passing the baton on this one issue. It might also be just crazy enough to work on a crazy man.