US Foreign Policy and the NeoCon Platform

Russia's President, Dmitry Medvedev, once again stunned Western nations with the announcement that Russia now recognizes Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent regions. This news is unnerving for a myriad of reasons; the most obvious being that the rules of international law are being destroyed in part because a country has shown it can invade a sovereign nation without consequence. It is also equally obvious and equally unnerving that a country (a G-8 member, no less) can recognize regions within a different nation's borders as independent. However, a more nuanced reason this is unnerving is the bigger picture this paints in regards to a Second Cold War and the U.S.'s current approach to addressing it. Along this theme, the BBC had a fascinating interview with Georgian President, Mikheil Saakashvili. (Watch the interview.) As Saakashvili adroitly points out, this is much bigger than a regional issue. This is a nation [Russia] unilaterally trying to redraw the European map. These actions are nothing short of the first deliberate steps towards a new Cold War of ideals. Thus, if the U.S. is, in fact, entering (or already has entered) a Second Cold War, then analyzing the U.S.'s foreign policy platform is as important now as it has been since the end of the original Cold War. For the duration of the Bush Administration, the United States has adhered to a NeoCon-based foreign policy. For years a debate had raged in Washington over the academic validity of a NeoCon strategy to world issues. It is well documented that Cheney and Wolfowitz, among others, believed that intervention would lead to a domino effect of democracy. (For the full-blown edict on this concept, read The Project for the New American Century treatise entitled Rebuilding America's Defenses: Strategies, Forces, and Resources For a New Century.) Even though the debate over the NeoCon movement faded in public circles after the failed efforts in Iraq, it has not in the White House. The Bush Administration continues to speak in NeoCon tones, and still pushes these concepts as the best strategy. A pillar to the NeoCon belief is that once a country has become a part of the capitalistic society, it has too much at stake to risk alienation by other trading partners by using military force or aggression. Essentially, it is the belief that greed triumphs all. However, we are witnessing the double-edged sword of greed; i.e., capitalism. While the promise of wealth through capitalism can push communistic nations into ruins like we saw at the end of the U.S.S.R.; it is being exhibited that greed doesn't necessarily beat out nationalism. This is a major flaw in the NeoCon beliefs. Russia is proving, quite effectively, that a Neo-Communistic state can embrace greed while still maintaining an over-riding sense of nationalism and power. If this is true, then in one brief summer, Russia has ended the debate on the power of capitalism as a chief weapon in a NeoCon strategy. While the idea of spreading democracy is admirable and the belief in capitalism must remain a key element to all U.S. foreign policies, it is time to charter a new course for U.S. international efforts. While Geopolitical Thoughts is not calling for a return to Detente, the methods to support the NeoCon ideals have shown to be imprudent. As we embark upon a new U.S. presidency, it is vital to consider a new course in foreign policy as our foes no longer appear to be not only developing-nations of moderate size in the Middle East and SE Asia; but also, massively-populated, wealthy nations. Therefore, the next U.S. president must embrace a long-term foreign policy that addresses immediate and larger threats such as Neo-Communist Russia, as well as possible future threats such as Neo-Communist China. It is Geopolitical Thoughts belief that the U.S., heretofore, has not adequately appreciated the long-term implications of the Russian actions. Once hailed a new breed of Former-Soviet-Union leaders, Mikhail Saakashvili has been a trusted champion for U.S. interests in the region. However, political wonks in Georgia say that Saakashvili has played his cards poorly, and is now in serious jeopardy of losing power. (To listen to the BBC interview, President Saakashvili's words had a tone of resignation.) If the failed invasion of Iraq wasn't enough to shift the U.S. foreign policy away from a NeoCon platform, losing such an advocate as Saakashvili better. If not, the U.S. actions, or lack thereof, are putting the U.S. further into a position of strategic weakness for years to come.

This is Not Your Father's Soviet Union

Suddenly, it's the good ol days. All Russia, all the time. Where is Thatcher and Reagan when we need them? While it's good that the mainstream media is now focused on the pending implications of a new Russian dominance; it is also important that a modicum of understanding be applied to the subject. Yes, Russia did invade the break-away region of South Ossetia, Georgia. Yes, Russia has shown little interest in listening to the US's opinions. Yes, Russia is showing strong body language over its distaste for the Polish-US missile agreement. However, this is not your father's form of Soviet Communism, and that is important to note. The Russian actions over the past few weeks are nothing that contradict their actions over the past few years. What we are seeing out of Russia is a consistent posturing that is in accord with their new form of government: Neo-Communism. The problem is that fear can manifest itself into action. This is something that the US leadership must refrain from doing. One example of this would be Ukraine. This past weekend, reports began to surface of a growing concern about Russia's interest of next going into Ukraine. The fears within this once-Soviet-bloc nation are high. Aides to the President of Ukraine are accusing the Prime Minister, Yulia Tymoshenko, of supporting Russia's moves into Georgia and is a Russian sympathizer. Even the NY Times has jumped on the theme (http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/17/world/europe/17ukraine.html?th&emc=th). However, it is GeoPolitical Thinking's belief that a more thorough examination of the situation is warranted before we start building our modern-day nuke bunkers and rewrite Paul McCarthy's "Back in the U.S.S.R.". While GeoPolitical Thinking is not supporting Russia's invasion into South Ossetia, it was not an action in a vacuum. Russo-Georgian relationships have been strained for years, lest we forget that Georgia is one of the few former Soviet nations to deploy troops to Iraq in support of the US administration's actions. (Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili was lead to believe by the US administration that supporting the US in the Middle East would ensure support for him, if need be, against Russia. A quid pro quo that Saakashvili is finding out will only go so far.) This year, before the images of tanks rolling into South Ossetia popped up on television sets, Russia and Georgia were in tense talks over Abkhazia, a different region of Georgia that broke away before South Ossetia did.) The point is, to say that Russia invaded a defenseless nation is an overstatement and a blatant decision to ignore the broader picture. It is GeoPolitical Thinking's perspective that the new brand of Russian rule, Neo-Communism, is not interested in country-invading. That would lead Russia down the same path it knows won't work. Instead, Putin (and his surrogate, Medvedev) sees the former satellite nations as a buffer zone. By keeping these nations from being full-blown democratic, US-EU-mini-me's; strategically, Russia keeps any nation from having an easy path into Russian home soils. While the thought of a country invading Russia is silly; it is, nonetheless, a strategic mandate Russia must embrace for itself to ensure a strong national defense. Just as we would do the same if Mexico were an avenue for invasion (should those untrusting nations of Panama or Belize become hostile!), Russia must always protect its boarders as a part of a bigger strategy. (Even if this is done poorly by keeping some former satellites in disarray.) It is also important to realize that a strategy of conflicts over democracy in satellite nations doesn't necessarily mean Russia loses. It is an indirect way of maintaining regional dominance. While we must closely watch actions and comments from the Kremlin, if we begin to behave like we are fighting the U.S.S.R. and it's 1984, we are weakening our defensive posture. The US military cannot afford to do that.