Iraq, the War on Terror, & the Patraeus Report

Introduction
With the deluge of political spin surrounding the Patraeus Report, the preceding National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), and Bush's recent visit to the Middle East, there is much confusion with what this all truly means. As such, the further our involvement in Iraq the more important it becomes to step away from the fray of commentary and observe the current status in Iraq. However this review should not be done in a vacuum, but with the perspective of our long-term national security interests. Unfortunately, the subject has become so politically charged that macro thinking has become a forgotten aspect of our efforts in the Middle East. This essay is neither to justify nor condemn our policies, but an attempt to provide an academic overview of current U.S. foreign interactions in hopes to help further the discussion. Furthermore, understanding the intricacies of nation-state efforts to exercise will upon others is vital to understanding U.S. strategies. In the face of increased foreign policy complexities (the burgeoning Russo-Sino rapport, Iranian-Saudi efforts to impact Iraq outcomes, Chinese growth in blue-water naval operations, etc.) this not only is more important than ever; but also, more difficult.

Deeper Analysis: Understanding the Patraeus Report
It is helpful to understand what the Patraeus Report to Congress is and what it isn't. The Patraeus Report is as basic and simple as it appears: a status of military success, and of actions that are known as Operations Other Than War (OOTW). It is not a broader, truly long-term assessment of our ultimate goals in Iraq. Nor is it even a measuring stick in our political goals for reshaping the Middle East. Worse yet, and most important, the reports citing limited examples of progress in Iraq is not a measuring stick for our efforts in the ultimate purpose of our actions: the War on Terror. The 20,000 troop surge in Iraq has become a flash-point for political rallying. Much of General Patraeus's testimony focused on the surge, but the surge is really not what matters. There is little doubt that the surge has generated some positive outcomes. But we cannot deduce that the surge is the primary reason for reduced violence during the summer months, lest we forget that concurrent to the surge has been the freeze on the activities of Iraqi Shiite leader Muqtada al-Sadr's Mehdi Army. This has had as much impact on allowing U.S. forces in Iraq to intensify operations against al Qaeda as has the surge. As George Friedman points out, "the surge was not really about reducing violence levels or helping the Iraqi government...". The surge had more to do with our efforts to deter Iranian ambitions. Unfortunately, it is safe to say we failed in that goal. Not only were we unable to reach any accords with Iran in direct talks - something that should have received much more attention here in the US - but it can be argued we have emboldened Ahmadinejad and Rafsanjani in the process. This is why it is important to use the recent reports and testimony as a time to stop and take stock of where we are in our broader efforts.

The Bigger Picture:
The downplay of the importance of the NEI assessment and Patraeus's testimony is not an attempt to belittle the study outcomes. However, the reports are more insightful when considering it in the broader War onTerror. This is where the bigger picture is vital and helps us better frame our long-term efforts and properly absorb the flow of news reports and conflicting opinions from the Hill. In many ways, our current War on Terror has as many similarities to the non-combative Cold War than it does prior military actions. That is a reality overlooked in our constant efforts to compare the Iraq War to Vietnam. This is important to note for a few reasons. (1) This is true because the War on Terror isn't about small-levels military success. The Cold War comparison reminds us what War is - not a limited military action, but an exercise of Political Will. It is a tool to enforce National Strategy used by politicians, much like our use of Diplomacy was in the Cold War was the primary tool for four decades. (2) The ultimate success of the War on Terror will not come as the result to our military presence in Iraq, but whether or not the desire of freedom from the local population takes root. That is the very reason we eventually won the Cold War and the very reason we are at risk of never winning the War on Terror... surge or no surge. This is not to say thereisn't a deep-rooted yearning from populations the world-over for true freedoms such as those fighting for democracy in Iraq. It is because we aren't representing freedom the way we did so admirably throughout the Cold War. As Norman Podhoretz so adroitly points out in his new book, "World War IV", this action is truly a question of political will. No matter how long we commit to a surge, no victory can come without that oft-forgottencomponent of the Clauswitzian Trinity: The Will of the People. Currently,we are losing the will of our people and the will of the Iraqi. And that is not good. Another outcome from this deeper understanding of the macro is the realization that we need to exercise a greater degree of caution when interpreting newsflow. This is most notable by the attempts to handicap publicly-traded stocks of defense companies and DoD budget projections. Already, we have witnessed Wall Street analysts argue for increases in spending on large defense contractsfor end-items (MRAP's, etc) from these reports, which is a loose correlation at best. At the end of the day, our stretched force structureis not a correlation to a need for increased spend. (Believe it or not, our DoD budget is plenty bloated.) Nor is our need for improved refurbishment of major equipment something that will see improved DoD funding as a result of follow-through from these reports. This is because of what has already been stated, that the Patraeus Report and the NEI assessment is a basic tool in measuring a very limited scope of operations.

Conclusion:
There is a nearly insurmountable amount of progress that needs to be met in Iraq for any level of meaningful success. Similarly, there is an insurmountable amount of news and political spin on the subject. The result of these is an oft-misunderstood situation surrounding a limited military engagement as part of an even more-misunderstood set of national strategic goals. Hopefully, a better understanding of how to interpret this will help force better dialogue on the subject that needs to be front and center, the War on Terror, and less on the limited impact of a 20,000 troop surge. Ultimately, it should be the aim of the government to stop politicizing the minutia of our Iraqi efforts, and push towards a broader understanding of our national goals in the bigger context. That will not only help ensure more informed voters; but more importantly, drive us towards achieving the bigger goal of safe national borders and improved standing amongst ourpeers on the international stage.