Piracy’s Long Tentacles

Many of the items that shocked the international system in 2008 are quickly fading into the past. The November U.S. elections and the global economic meltdown have put events such as Russia’s invasion of South Ossetia in the rear view mirror. Even the terrorist attacks in Mumbai are now focused on the tension between India and Pakistan instead of the actual implications of the attacks themselves. Yet each of these stories needs to be further discussed and integrated into foreign policy agendas and defense posturing.

Piracy’s Long Arm
One such item that has become a case study instead of a wake-up call for military planners was the Somali pirate attacks. On a stand-alone basis, the issue appears to have been thoroughly addressed. China has taken a hard-line approach. The U.S. is now implementing drones to monitor and respond to any action. In fact, the international response to the region has been so swift that even Japan altered it’s 50-year-plus position regarding use of Naval force to get involved. However, the reason for integrating piracy into state and defense lexicon does not lie in the events of 2008, but as part of the bigger issue about force protection.

While Geopolitical Thoughts applauds the efforts of the Armed Forces Journal for its detailed discussion of the subject, the broader issue continues to be overlooked. Namely, how is the U.S. modifying Naval tactics to counter small-ship efforts against Naval fleet and merchant marine operations during combat operations? Piracy is just one variable to this problem.

The Origins of a Problem
The concept that a small group of pirates could seize a crude tanker or luxury cruise seemed quite unlikely two years ago. For many policy analysts, such an event would be considered a long-tail event (referring to the statistical unlikelihood in the third- and fourth-standard deviation on a standard bell curve). However, these sort of statistically-unlikely events are precisely what must be addressed in an increased terrorism environment.

Geopolitical Thoughts has been monitoring such long-tail events with concern since 2002. (In reality, 9/11 was a long-tail event, but to say the U.S. has over-corrected regarding safeguards against 9/11-esque attacks is an understatement and not the point of this discussion.) In the fall of 2002, a shocking event occurred during a benign war game that reveals one of the Navy’s greatest Achilles heels: swarm tactics.

In the run-up to the Iraqi invasion, the U.S. military was going through standard war simulations. However, a retired Marine general who had long seen the weakness of the war games and Naval tactics chose to stir the pot. By injecting a simple wrinkle while playing the opposition force, General Van Riper, essentially brought the war game to its knees. As retold in a smattering of news reports, “as commander of a low-tech, third-world army, Gen Van Riper appeared to have repeatedly outwitted US forces. He sent orders with motorcycle couriers to evade sophisticated electronic eavesdropping equipment. When the U.S. fleet sailed into the Gulf, he instructed his small boats and planes to move around in apparently aimless circles before launching a surprise attack which sank a substantial part of the U.S. Navy.”

By 2003, the story of this event was quickly overshadowed by U.S. actions on the ground – in the real world. However, a year ago an event happened that quickly pushed this memory to the forefront. Using similar swam tactics, five Iranian boats “harassed” U.S. Navy ships in startlingly-effective methods. As General Van Riper told the N.Y. Times following the Iranian episode, “the sheer numbers involved overloaded their ability…”

The Significance of the Problem
The U.S. Navy speaks to the swarm tactics as an ongoing examination for lessons-learned. Similarly, the U.S. continues to bow its back aggressively against acts of piracy. However, both cases demonstrate the ability of small, fast-moving opposition to cause major impact on naval operations. Not only is it alarming that both have been proven beyond the concept-phase; but also, it is frustrating that both have been largely ignored by the U.S. military as part of tactical doctrine.

Furthermore, these real-world lessons are a component of the downside to force transformation (a subject that needs to be reconsidered in broader detail.) Transformation has been a popular phrase since before 9/11. Former-Chief of Staff of the Army Eric Shinseki was using it long before Rumsfeld. But Rumsfeld took it to a higher level. Rumsfeld didn’t just embrace the phrase, but actually created an Office of Force Transformation. While these efforts have merit, they also have their downside. One of these shortcomings is an increased burden on civilian lift capacity to meet logistical demands for troop and equipment movement.

It might be easy to address piracy today. The Army and, to a lesser degree the Air Force, may be occupied with ground operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Yet the Navy has been sitting relatively idle for some time. For the time being, the Navy can dedicate significant time and attention to a problem that seems easily containable with a few drones and joint efforts with coalition forces.

Similarly, the swam tactic threats highlighted from the 2002 episode with Iranian boats might seem small today. The Navy acknowledges the issue, which at least is a start. There is no media attention to it, nor does it seem to be a priority in the halls of the Pentagon. However, it is precisely these long-tail events that can create the most catastrophic results for U.S. forces – especially should the U.S. Navy become more occupied with easier-to-see problems.

Summary
The U.S. must begin to address issues in the nascent form instead of reacting to an issue only after it has become an internationally-acknowledged problem. It is easy to dismiss the piracy issues over the past year as isolated. To be sure, Geopolitical Thoughts does not seek to makes a habit of ringing the alarmist bell. However, this publication firmly believes that these issues are not garnering enough attention due to their larger implications of force security and naval policies.