Posts
Summary
As the calendar shifts into 2009’s back half, it is important to develop a better understanding of the upcoming Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). While the QDR’s primary purpose is to guide defense posturing with a 20 year horizon, the budget allegations get the most attention. Because these budget implications have such immediate inferences for states with large defense spending, it vital that policy makers and legislators stay focused on long-term strategy. QDR authors must insulate themselves from the vocal opinions of outside parties and the well-documented cliché about fighting the last war. Any manipulation of strategy decisions purely for the purpose of current weapon platform expenditures not only hinders the academic process; but also, hurts future U.S. security.
The Basics About the QDR
It can be argued that the Quadrennial Defense Review is one of the most important documents generated on Capitol Hill. Considering the percent of discretionary spending dedicated to defense spending, and the impact a military force structure has on the ability for a U.S. president to implement foreign policy goals, this seemingly benign document carries significant implications.
On paper, the purpose of the QDR is straight forward. It was first produced in 1996 after then-SecDef Les Aspin saw a need to create a planning and guiding document after the fall of the Soviet Union. Up to that point, such a creative exercise would have been considered unnecessary as the direction of foreign policy had been evident for over 5 decades. Congress agreed and requested the QDR through its incorporation into Title 10, the code in the U.S. law outlining the role of the armed forces.
The Cliché That Alters Bullets
Since the beginning of the War on Terror, the U.S. has continued the long tradition of upholding the cliché that governments and militaries constantly try to fight future wars by preparing against the last one. The Iraqi War began down that path in 2003 before a neutered 2006 Bush Administration finally allowed military leaders to refocus mission efforts. The newfound freedoms for CENTCOM leaders enabled them to better apply counterinsurgency doctrine and break away from the truism. However, while field-level leadership broke the paradigm on one warfront, the potency of this historical pattern of military spending and preparing is far from dead.
The cliché is happening even today in Afghanistan as U.S. field commanders are just now realizing the insurgency is very different than what was seen in Iraq. This conscious realization about warfare is important for the U.S. to succeed in Afghanistan. However, it is equally important that defense leaders and elected officials realize the trappings of trying to structure a military from the lessons learned of the last war. Doing so risks disregarding the guiding principles of long-range strategy and foreign policy. It is in this framework that Geopolitical Thoughts hopes those directly involved in the 2010 QDR discount the constant whispering from interested parties. This includes properly filtering the dialogue generated from combatant commanders, as powerful as their collective voice may be.
The QDR Turns Political
The QDR and its final report to Congress has quickly become a document with such far-reaching implications that its purpose now seems muddled. It is important to understand what the QDR is and what it isn’t. The QDR is congressionally mandated. The study is lead by the Department of Defense. Its assessments are to specifically drive the U.S.’s “national defense strategy, force structure, force modernization plans, infrastructure, budget plan, and other elements of the defense program and policies of the United States with a view toward determining and expressing the defense strategy of the United States and establishing a defense program for the next 20 years.” That is the official company line.
What isn’t the company line, nor should be, is anything pushing political opinions. Unfortunately, in short order from its origins the document has become just that. A cursory review from the previous report reveals such political overtures:
Since the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, our nation has fought a global war against violent extremists who use terrorism as their weapon of choice, and who seek to destroy our free way of life. Our enemies seek weapons of mass destruction and, if they are successful, will likely attempt to use them in their conflict with free people everywhere. Currently, the struggle is centered in Iraq and Afghanistan, but we will need to be prepared and arranged to successfully defend our nation and its interests around the globe for years to come.
From this opening salvo, a strong rhetoric becomes evident. The rationale for inserting phrases as magnanimous as “terrorism [is the] weapon of choice,” and “[they will] attempt to use [WMD’s against] free people everywhere.” can only be answered by those who wrote the document’s final draft. However, such an example sheds light on the influence political and monetary motives can have on the QDR.. Turning philosophical debates about foreign threats into fact is academically misleading, at best; serving a political purpose at worst. More specifically, by focusing Congress on the present conflicts instead of longer-term security doctrine it becomes easier to influence the budget process for preferred weapons platforms.
Only About the Here-and-Now
Another risk to creating a proper QDR comes from current military operations. While the perspective of what field commanders need for current military success is important for current defense spending, it inadvertently skews the process. Placing too much weight on immediate military requirements only perpetuates the “last war” cliché. The actions and opinions of senior military leaders is powerful. Regrettably, their voices too easily become a mea culpa for politicians when pushing for large defense expenditures as well as policy makers with ulterior motives. The risk this impact has is that current war efforts excessively effects future military structure. The debate within the halls of the Pentagon already reveals the sway such voices carry towards a push to mirror the future force towards today’s needs.
As Frank Hoffman points out in the this month’s Armed Forces Journal, significant changes about the perception of future threats as a result of post-9/11 military operations is already happening. Senior military and agency leaders involved in the 2010 QDR have fallen into multiple camps arguing for varying degrees of focus on Middle East forms of counterinsurgency for the future U.S. military structure. Yielding too far to the counterinsurgent’s camp could be a vicious false step. As Hoffman highlights:
“The current bifurcation of the spectrum of conflict between irregular and conventional wars is a false choice and intellectually blinds us to a number of crucial issues. We need to assess our assumptions about frequency, consequences and risk far more carefully and analytically. The QDR’s options are not simply preparing for long-term counterinsurgency operations or high-intensity conflict. We must be able to do both and do them simultaneously against enemies far more ruthless than today’s.”
Conclusion
The Pentagon has just concluded Phase 1 consisting of ‘issue team’ work. The process now enters the final months of workgroups and issue integration that comprises Phase 2 before the Secretary of Defense presents the final product to Congress in February 2010. During this homestretch when concepts are placed on paper, it is vital that policy makers and those involved at the advisory work group level maintain a long-term strategic perspective and not be too influenced by current operations. The distractions of a tried-and-true cliché as well as the opinions of third parties will weight heavy on the process. Policy makers and legislators must keep focused on the massive challenge presented to them and not allow these outside influences to distract. Failing to do so risks turning the strategically-vital academic process into a political exercise. Worse, any deviation from a long-term focus on foreign and defense policy could drastically impact future national security.
Wednesday, July 29, 2009
Wednesday, June 3, 2009
The North Korea Conundrum: An Unusual Diplomatic Approach to a Persistent Problem
Summary:
Like most of the developed world, Geopolitical Thoughts was rather surprised by the recent actions of hostility out of Pyongyang. While chalking up North Korea’s aggressive overtures to the dictator’s instability seems like an over-simplification to the problem, it might provide the most logical direction towards an untraditional approach. With that in mind, it is Geopolitical Thoughts’ opinion that not only is Jong-il’s mental instability the biggest underlying reason for the country’s acts; but also, it is this very underpinning that should dictate the United State’s response. The less-than-traditional line of thinking, however, is that the process yield’s an unpredictable outcome: that the U.S. response should be very minor, if any.
A Historical Refresher:
When discussing North Korean-U.S. relations, it is important to briefly consider the past 15 years. This duration encompasses Kim Jong-il’s reign following his father’s death in 1994. Prior to that time, the Korean Peninsula had been relatively calm since the end of the Korean War. However, what at first seemed like a new leader willing to work with the U.S.-led international community quickly unraveled into a decade-plus span of deceit and conflict. This line of deception started as soon as Jong-il agreed to freeze their nuclear program in exchange for $5 billion of free fuel and two nuclear reactors, to which Jong-il immediately returned towards the pursuit of nuclear weaponry.
Now, two U.S. president’s later, policy experts are still trying to understand how the Clinton Administration’s approach to North Korea failed so badly. Yet hindsight is 20-20, and only now is it evident that a carrot-and-stick approach layering in economic incentives does not lead to any transparency or honesty out of Pyongyang. Direct negotiations has only led to direct deception. By the time the Bush Administration took the reins of foreign policy, the prevailing wisdom was the U.S. would not allow another chance for North Korea to make the U.S. look foolish or naïve. Enter into the equation six-party negotiations. Without delving into the reasons for this drastic shift in diplomatic approach, it is now fair to say that multi-party diplomacy resulted in the same end-state, only this time China, Japan, and Russia can now be considered amongst the family-members fools. (It is fair to openly discuss China’s vested interest in the process, but that is a separate discussion.) In the meantime, not much has changed. North Korea remains a closed society that is failing economically with the same fanatical dictator willing to sacrifice the country’s very existence through extreme demonstrations of power and threats. This trial-and-error method of diplomacy by the U.S. has produced no good results, and forced policy makers to scramble for the next course of action. However, this is where Geopolitical Thoughts believes the policy planners must make one vital change to the basic assumptions about North Korea: traditional foreign policy does not succeed when the counterparty is not rational.
Making New Perspectives on Old News:
Establishing a baseline assumption that Kim Jong-il is not rational is rather easy. Aside from the connection of dots made by any examination of the person, a more revealing portrait develops when looking at the same news reels from a different psychological perspective. The thought of pursuing this approach first surfaced after Geopolitical Thoughts read the points made by Mark Landler in a NY Times article about the Korean situation. However, if a picture is worth a thousand words, then a more damning conclusion can be made by gazing upon some recent photos from this dictatorship. Not only is it more obvious that Kim Jong-il is in ill-health, but the country might be closer to collapse than even Western experts realize. Jong-il masterfully fills a movie character description of an lunatic who only cares about his legacy and family lineage. This need for adulation is strong, and possibly a driving force behind external actions. The country runs propaganda on state-run television citing legends of Jong-il’s immortality. One example is of Jong-il, someone who disdains golf, having hit a hole-in-one on his first-ever tee shot at the country’s only pro-level golf course. Conversely, dissidents describe Jong-il as an illiterate man who is not of all his faculties after a stroke last year. The intelligence community has spoken of an aging individual so consumed with insuring his power is transferred to his youngest son and that his legacy is carried forward into eternity that he is willing say or do anything to instill internal fear against potential domestic threats. Through this lens, the recent missile launches and underground nuclear tests might actually be an internal show of strength and nothing more. Instead of a real threat to the region, these acts may actually be those of a desperate man acting out as fear overcomes him.
Further data points only further validate this odd claim. Curtis Melvin and others have started to peel back the veil of this isolated nation. His work and imagery point towards the same conclusion. Word that Jong-il remains skeptical of his once-banished brother-in-law, Jang Song Taek. Jong-il doesn’t even have faith in his two middle sons. Incorporating the perspectives from basic psychology into an interdisciplinary approach validates the argument that Kim Jong-il, and by default, North Korea, is irrational. This means that this particular nation state is impervious to traditional diplomatic approaches. Therefore, the best foreign policy option for the U.S. might be to do nothing at all.
A New Policy Approach: A Road Never Taken:
Arguing that the United States do nothing, or next to nothing, might seem as irrational as Kim Jong-il is. However, there is merit to migrating towards the isolationism end of the foreign policy spectrum with North Korea so long as it is interlaced into a broader regional strategy. It encourages more international support, which will be well received in international circles. Moreover, it forces China and Russia to get off the ambiguous fence on which they have sat within the U.N. National Security Council. This makes China a more vested partner in international peace, and can serve as a signal to them and Russia that the U.S. respects their ability to police their backyard.
The time might be ripe for such a drastic shift in policy towards the Pacific Asian region. This concept would have been impossible 15 years ago when the Clinton Administration was forced into the fold as Russia was in a de-Soviet-Unionizing mess and China had barely moved past the 1989 Tiananmen Square uprising. The idea might not have even been possible in 2003 when the Bush Administration first engaged in six-party talks. China’s massive move into a global economic leadership position was just in the proverbial first inning. Meanwhile Russia was not yet swimming in cash from the commodity bubble as crude had just crossed $40 a barrel for the first time since the early 1980’s. However, much has changed. For the first time, more parties seem willing to take a leadership role.
China has been abnormally outspoken against North Korea’s actions. Furthermore, China has made strong signals in the past few weeks that reveal a greater desire to be an integral player in the global community, not just from an economic perspective; but also from a proactive leadership role. The effects of gradual globalization and capitalistic ventures might have finally pushed China past the tipping point to where they now realize it is no longer fiscally prudent for them to placate an aggressive nation like North Korea just for the sake of acting defiant on the U.N. Security Council. Even other nations in the region are stepping up to the plate more. For the first time in nearly a generation, South Korea is pushing back. This affords the United States a rare opportunity to be supportive of others, much like a caring older sibling, without having to risk much politically. By merely letting China, South Korea and others know that the U.S. is willing and ready to come to anyone’s aide if need be, the U.S. can finally sit on the fence for a change. The derivative effect of proxy diplomacy is it also provides the U.S. a chance to resume a position of moral leadership without risking the need to use the proverbial big stick.
Conclusion:
A “Do Nothing” policy doesn’t seem like the most logical strategy for the U.S. to pursue when weighing the North Korean situation. On the surface, it doesn’t seem like much of a strategy at all. However, it might just be the new approach that resonates best with the other players in the region who will welcome the symbolic gesture that the U.S. is passing the baton on this one issue. It might also be just crazy enough to work on a crazy man.
Like most of the developed world, Geopolitical Thoughts was rather surprised by the recent actions of hostility out of Pyongyang. While chalking up North Korea’s aggressive overtures to the dictator’s instability seems like an over-simplification to the problem, it might provide the most logical direction towards an untraditional approach. With that in mind, it is Geopolitical Thoughts’ opinion that not only is Jong-il’s mental instability the biggest underlying reason for the country’s acts; but also, it is this very underpinning that should dictate the United State’s response. The less-than-traditional line of thinking, however, is that the process yield’s an unpredictable outcome: that the U.S. response should be very minor, if any.
A Historical Refresher:
When discussing North Korean-U.S. relations, it is important to briefly consider the past 15 years. This duration encompasses Kim Jong-il’s reign following his father’s death in 1994. Prior to that time, the Korean Peninsula had been relatively calm since the end of the Korean War. However, what at first seemed like a new leader willing to work with the U.S.-led international community quickly unraveled into a decade-plus span of deceit and conflict. This line of deception started as soon as Jong-il agreed to freeze their nuclear program in exchange for $5 billion of free fuel and two nuclear reactors, to which Jong-il immediately returned towards the pursuit of nuclear weaponry.
Now, two U.S. president’s later, policy experts are still trying to understand how the Clinton Administration’s approach to North Korea failed so badly. Yet hindsight is 20-20, and only now is it evident that a carrot-and-stick approach layering in economic incentives does not lead to any transparency or honesty out of Pyongyang. Direct negotiations has only led to direct deception. By the time the Bush Administration took the reins of foreign policy, the prevailing wisdom was the U.S. would not allow another chance for North Korea to make the U.S. look foolish or naïve. Enter into the equation six-party negotiations. Without delving into the reasons for this drastic shift in diplomatic approach, it is now fair to say that multi-party diplomacy resulted in the same end-state, only this time China, Japan, and Russia can now be considered amongst the family-members fools. (It is fair to openly discuss China’s vested interest in the process, but that is a separate discussion.) In the meantime, not much has changed. North Korea remains a closed society that is failing economically with the same fanatical dictator willing to sacrifice the country’s very existence through extreme demonstrations of power and threats. This trial-and-error method of diplomacy by the U.S. has produced no good results, and forced policy makers to scramble for the next course of action. However, this is where Geopolitical Thoughts believes the policy planners must make one vital change to the basic assumptions about North Korea: traditional foreign policy does not succeed when the counterparty is not rational.
Making New Perspectives on Old News:
Establishing a baseline assumption that Kim Jong-il is not rational is rather easy. Aside from the connection of dots made by any examination of the person, a more revealing portrait develops when looking at the same news reels from a different psychological perspective. The thought of pursuing this approach first surfaced after Geopolitical Thoughts read the points made by Mark Landler in a NY Times article about the Korean situation. However, if a picture is worth a thousand words, then a more damning conclusion can be made by gazing upon some recent photos from this dictatorship. Not only is it more obvious that Kim Jong-il is in ill-health, but the country might be closer to collapse than even Western experts realize. Jong-il masterfully fills a movie character description of an lunatic who only cares about his legacy and family lineage. This need for adulation is strong, and possibly a driving force behind external actions. The country runs propaganda on state-run television citing legends of Jong-il’s immortality. One example is of Jong-il, someone who disdains golf, having hit a hole-in-one on his first-ever tee shot at the country’s only pro-level golf course. Conversely, dissidents describe Jong-il as an illiterate man who is not of all his faculties after a stroke last year. The intelligence community has spoken of an aging individual so consumed with insuring his power is transferred to his youngest son and that his legacy is carried forward into eternity that he is willing say or do anything to instill internal fear against potential domestic threats. Through this lens, the recent missile launches and underground nuclear tests might actually be an internal show of strength and nothing more. Instead of a real threat to the region, these acts may actually be those of a desperate man acting out as fear overcomes him.
Further data points only further validate this odd claim. Curtis Melvin and others have started to peel back the veil of this isolated nation. His work and imagery point towards the same conclusion. Word that Jong-il remains skeptical of his once-banished brother-in-law, Jang Song Taek. Jong-il doesn’t even have faith in his two middle sons. Incorporating the perspectives from basic psychology into an interdisciplinary approach validates the argument that Kim Jong-il, and by default, North Korea, is irrational. This means that this particular nation state is impervious to traditional diplomatic approaches. Therefore, the best foreign policy option for the U.S. might be to do nothing at all.
A New Policy Approach: A Road Never Taken:
Arguing that the United States do nothing, or next to nothing, might seem as irrational as Kim Jong-il is. However, there is merit to migrating towards the isolationism end of the foreign policy spectrum with North Korea so long as it is interlaced into a broader regional strategy. It encourages more international support, which will be well received in international circles. Moreover, it forces China and Russia to get off the ambiguous fence on which they have sat within the U.N. National Security Council. This makes China a more vested partner in international peace, and can serve as a signal to them and Russia that the U.S. respects their ability to police their backyard.
The time might be ripe for such a drastic shift in policy towards the Pacific Asian region. This concept would have been impossible 15 years ago when the Clinton Administration was forced into the fold as Russia was in a de-Soviet-Unionizing mess and China had barely moved past the 1989 Tiananmen Square uprising. The idea might not have even been possible in 2003 when the Bush Administration first engaged in six-party talks. China’s massive move into a global economic leadership position was just in the proverbial first inning. Meanwhile Russia was not yet swimming in cash from the commodity bubble as crude had just crossed $40 a barrel for the first time since the early 1980’s. However, much has changed. For the first time, more parties seem willing to take a leadership role.
China has been abnormally outspoken against North Korea’s actions. Furthermore, China has made strong signals in the past few weeks that reveal a greater desire to be an integral player in the global community, not just from an economic perspective; but also from a proactive leadership role. The effects of gradual globalization and capitalistic ventures might have finally pushed China past the tipping point to where they now realize it is no longer fiscally prudent for them to placate an aggressive nation like North Korea just for the sake of acting defiant on the U.N. Security Council. Even other nations in the region are stepping up to the plate more. For the first time in nearly a generation, South Korea is pushing back. This affords the United States a rare opportunity to be supportive of others, much like a caring older sibling, without having to risk much politically. By merely letting China, South Korea and others know that the U.S. is willing and ready to come to anyone’s aide if need be, the U.S. can finally sit on the fence for a change. The derivative effect of proxy diplomacy is it also provides the U.S. a chance to resume a position of moral leadership without risking the need to use the proverbial big stick.
Conclusion:
A “Do Nothing” policy doesn’t seem like the most logical strategy for the U.S. to pursue when weighing the North Korean situation. On the surface, it doesn’t seem like much of a strategy at all. However, it might just be the new approach that resonates best with the other players in the region who will welcome the symbolic gesture that the U.S. is passing the baton on this one issue. It might also be just crazy enough to work on a crazy man.
Thursday, May 21, 2009
Lest We Forget the Slumbering Bear
There is a fascinating article on one of the foreign policy websites Geopolitical Thoughts considers a valuable resource: The Jamestown Foundation. The article discusses Russian President Medvedev's approval of the nation's national security strategy. It is rather shocking that there hasn’t been more press attention paid to the news since it first broke on May 12th. Although the argument about what to do with Russia can swing from 'non-event' to 'most critical long-term' depending upon whom is making the commentary, one point remains: At the very least, Russia must stay in the forefront of the U.S.’s collective foreign policy conscious. Even if Russia is now too intertwined in global capitalism's sticky tentacles to risk fiscal stress for the sake of promoting nationalistic interests, that does not mean they can't easily influence U.S. actions with other nations like China or Iran. Therefore, even if Russia is not a first-derivative threat, they are a true second derivative player.
Nevertheless, of all the chatter coming from the Middle East, the Caucasus, and the Far East - this particular article is rather startling. While it appears there are fair levels of attention currently being paid to the Pakistan's, Israel's, Iran's - and even the Sudan's - of the world, most recent news and commentary from Russia has been focused on their current financial troubles and not their possible shift in foreign policy. The article is listed below:
Energy and the Russian National Security Strategy
May 18, 2009
By: Roman Kupchinsky
On May 12 Russian President Dmitry Medvedev approved the latest version of the "National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation up to 2020" (www.scrf.gov.ru, May 12). The text of the 7,300 word document was posted on the website of the Russian Security Council and is certain to be studied by analysts in the hope of finding clues to Russian behavior in the years to come. The National Security Strategy doctrine outlines the basic fears and assumptions shared by the current Russian leadership about the state of the world and Russia's place in it. It addresses these concerns within the context of Russian national interests, and by doing so opens a window into the thinking of the political elite on such an important issue as its use of natural resources - above all hydrocarbon reserves - as a foreign policy tool.
During the past decade Russian leaders have frequently rejected charges made by European and American leaders that they are using energy as a weapon of foreign policy. The facts, however, point to a different conclusion. On February 4 Ukrayinska Pravda reported that Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin stated: "Russia enjoys vast energy and mineral resources which serve as a base to develop its economy; as an instrument to implement domestic and foreign policy. The role of the country on international energy markets determines, in many ways, its geopolitical influence." This thesis was not new, it found its way into the 2003 "Energy Strategy of Russia for the Period of up to 2020" which stated at the outset that: "Russia possesses great energy resources... which is the basis of economic development and the instrument for carrying out internal and external policy" (www.ec.europa.eu, August 28, 2003).
Putin's views were incorporated into the security doctrine in a roundabout but nonetheless blunt manner. Paragraph 9 of the doctrine states: "The change from bloc confrontation to the principles of multi-vector diplomacy and the [natural] resources potential of Russia, along with the pragmatic policies of using them has expanded the possibilities of the Russian Federation to strengthen its influence on the world arena" (www.scrf.gov.ru, May 12). In other words, Russia's energy resources were once again officially acknowledged to be tools of Russian foreign policy, or as some believe, a lever for blackmail. There was apparently no further reason for denying the obvious, and the authors of the security doctrine decided to lay out Russia's cards on the table.
Paragraph 11 lists the geopolitical battlegrounds where Russia believes that the future conflicts over energy will arise - and where, by definition, its national interests lie: "The attention of international politics in the long-term will be concentrated on controlling the sources of energy resources in the Middle East, on the shelf of the Barents Sea and other parts of the Arctic, in the Caspian Basin and in Central Asia" (www.scrf.gov.ru, May 12).
The document portrays a somewhat apocalyptic scenario of future conflicts over energy resources. "In case of a competitive struggle for resources it is not impossible to discount that it might be resolved by a decision to use military might. The existing balance of forces on the borders of the Russian Federation and its allies can be changed." But who will supposedly change the balance? According to the strategy, the United States Ballistic Missile Defense program is allegedly being constructed to destroy the Russian monopoly on gas supplies to Europe and therefore the U.S. remains the main antagonist.
Paragraph 47 continues the linkage between energy and Russian national security: "The sources of danger to national security could become such factors as the crisis of world and regional financial-banking systems, the intensification of the battle over natural resources, among them energy, water and consumer goods" (www.scrf.gov.ru, May 12).
As dramatic as the new Russian National Security Strategy appears, it does not differ substantially from the previous doctrine. Furthermore, Russian security policy appears to be betting heavily on resource nationalism in order to strengthen Russia's "benevolent" control of gas supplies throughout the Central and East European gas markets -the ultimate goal of which is the neutralization of the role played by these countries within NATO, along with the unending struggle to increase the profits for Kremlin-friendly Russian companies.
The lack of new, forward thinking, concepts within the latest Russian National Security Strategy doctrine is its major shortcoming. The latest security strategy appears more calculated to preserve the current Putin-Medvedev-Sechin-Gazprom clique, than to offering genuine answers to Russia's security needs. It is questionable whether the strategy is workable. Some EU member states such as Germany and Italy, have apparently reconciled themselves to the possibility of long-term Russian control over their economic well-being, and are turning a blind eye to any and all of Russia's opaque energy and pipeline deals in order to remain on good terms with the Kremlin -and maintain access to its gas pipelines. If the framers of the Russian security doctrine have determined that the energy Balkanization of Europe is part of their strategy to keep Russia safe and transform it once again into a great power, then they are off to a good start.
Nevertheless, of all the chatter coming from the Middle East, the Caucasus, and the Far East - this particular article is rather startling. While it appears there are fair levels of attention currently being paid to the Pakistan's, Israel's, Iran's - and even the Sudan's - of the world, most recent news and commentary from Russia has been focused on their current financial troubles and not their possible shift in foreign policy. The article is listed below:
Energy and the Russian National Security Strategy
May 18, 2009
By: Roman Kupchinsky
On May 12 Russian President Dmitry Medvedev approved the latest version of the "National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation up to 2020" (www.scrf.gov.ru, May 12). The text of the 7,300 word document was posted on the website of the Russian Security Council and is certain to be studied by analysts in the hope of finding clues to Russian behavior in the years to come. The National Security Strategy doctrine outlines the basic fears and assumptions shared by the current Russian leadership about the state of the world and Russia's place in it. It addresses these concerns within the context of Russian national interests, and by doing so opens a window into the thinking of the political elite on such an important issue as its use of natural resources - above all hydrocarbon reserves - as a foreign policy tool.
During the past decade Russian leaders have frequently rejected charges made by European and American leaders that they are using energy as a weapon of foreign policy. The facts, however, point to a different conclusion. On February 4 Ukrayinska Pravda reported that Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin stated: "Russia enjoys vast energy and mineral resources which serve as a base to develop its economy; as an instrument to implement domestic and foreign policy. The role of the country on international energy markets determines, in many ways, its geopolitical influence." This thesis was not new, it found its way into the 2003 "Energy Strategy of Russia for the Period of up to 2020" which stated at the outset that: "Russia possesses great energy resources... which is the basis of economic development and the instrument for carrying out internal and external policy" (www.ec.europa.eu, August 28, 2003).
Putin's views were incorporated into the security doctrine in a roundabout but nonetheless blunt manner. Paragraph 9 of the doctrine states: "The change from bloc confrontation to the principles of multi-vector diplomacy and the [natural] resources potential of Russia, along with the pragmatic policies of using them has expanded the possibilities of the Russian Federation to strengthen its influence on the world arena" (www.scrf.gov.ru, May 12). In other words, Russia's energy resources were once again officially acknowledged to be tools of Russian foreign policy, or as some believe, a lever for blackmail. There was apparently no further reason for denying the obvious, and the authors of the security doctrine decided to lay out Russia's cards on the table.
Paragraph 11 lists the geopolitical battlegrounds where Russia believes that the future conflicts over energy will arise - and where, by definition, its national interests lie: "The attention of international politics in the long-term will be concentrated on controlling the sources of energy resources in the Middle East, on the shelf of the Barents Sea and other parts of the Arctic, in the Caspian Basin and in Central Asia" (www.scrf.gov.ru, May 12).
The document portrays a somewhat apocalyptic scenario of future conflicts over energy resources. "In case of a competitive struggle for resources it is not impossible to discount that it might be resolved by a decision to use military might. The existing balance of forces on the borders of the Russian Federation and its allies can be changed." But who will supposedly change the balance? According to the strategy, the United States Ballistic Missile Defense program is allegedly being constructed to destroy the Russian monopoly on gas supplies to Europe and therefore the U.S. remains the main antagonist.
Paragraph 47 continues the linkage between energy and Russian national security: "The sources of danger to national security could become such factors as the crisis of world and regional financial-banking systems, the intensification of the battle over natural resources, among them energy, water and consumer goods" (www.scrf.gov.ru, May 12).
As dramatic as the new Russian National Security Strategy appears, it does not differ substantially from the previous doctrine. Furthermore, Russian security policy appears to be betting heavily on resource nationalism in order to strengthen Russia's "benevolent" control of gas supplies throughout the Central and East European gas markets -the ultimate goal of which is the neutralization of the role played by these countries within NATO, along with the unending struggle to increase the profits for Kremlin-friendly Russian companies.
The lack of new, forward thinking, concepts within the latest Russian National Security Strategy doctrine is its major shortcoming. The latest security strategy appears more calculated to preserve the current Putin-Medvedev-Sechin-Gazprom clique, than to offering genuine answers to Russia's security needs. It is questionable whether the strategy is workable. Some EU member states such as Germany and Italy, have apparently reconciled themselves to the possibility of long-term Russian control over their economic well-being, and are turning a blind eye to any and all of Russia's opaque energy and pipeline deals in order to remain on good terms with the Kremlin -and maintain access to its gas pipelines. If the framers of the Russian security doctrine have determined that the energy Balkanization of Europe is part of their strategy to keep Russia safe and transform it once again into a great power, then they are off to a good start.
Saturday, February 14, 2009
We Need Putin & Medvedev. (Say what?!)
Much is being made of the financial crisis hitting Russia. To be sure, Russia is unquestionably adrift in their own fiscal and monetary predicament. In fact, if reports are correct, the Russian fiscal crisis appears to be bigger than the U.S. However, from a foreign policy perspective it is important for the U.S. to not assume these issues are some form of opportunity to gain leverage over a country that has been increasingly bellicose during the Putin era. In fact, Geopolitical Thoughts believes not only that it would be a mistake to extrapolate the pressure the crisis is putting on leadership as validation of a weakened Russia; but also, the U.S. might need to do whatever necessary ensure the Putin-Medvedev leadership structure remains in power.
Geopolitical Thoughts readily admits that Russia and its leadership are not the best bedmates for the U.S. to seek. In fact, as more and more details slip through Russia’s own form of censorship, it is clear that Vladimir Putin is not an ordinary head of state. As has recently been seen with the terrifying stories related to the slain former body guard for the Chechnyan President, Akhmad Kadyrov (amongst countless other citations: 1, 2, 3), Putin appears fairly involved with violent retaliation against anyone that crosses him or his proxies. Considering these accusations, it begs the question to ask why support the leadership of an individual who appears more and more authoritarian than democratic? The answer is two-fold. The first comes in the form of a classic idiom, “Better the devil you know than the devil you don’t”. The second comes from a famous quote by Sun Tzu, “Keep you friends close and your enemies closer.”
Supporting the removal of Putin and his gang by stating “The devil you know…” might seem clichéd. However, like Saddam Hussein and the form of secular dictatorship he demonstrated, the U.S. must consider the devil that is known versus the devil that is unknown. This was a classic mistake made by the Cheney-Wolfowitz NeoCon-led efforts in 2003. While it is hard to predict if a collapse of leadership in Russia would create a genocidal, civil war like that which was witnessed in Iraq, it is still imprudent to believe the resulting power void would spawn an improved form of governance. In fact, it is curious to see the lost irony of recent articles highlighting demonstrations in Russia against the current leadership. Instead of groups promoting democratic reform, many of the protests are actually to push Russia back to Soviet Union-era communism. It is with that backdrop that Geopolitical Thoughts considers it hasty to assume a failed-state Russia or a political-coup of current leadership would result in an improved situation for U.S. interests or regional stability.
As for Sun Tzu’s theories from his timeless “The Art of War”, there are two reasons to apply his famous rule regarding friends, enemies, and proximities. The first reason is because Geopolitical Thoughts does not equate the Russian fiscal crisis as being the same as the long-term implications of crisis’s for most EU nations. Secondly, it is in these times of perceived need that long-term relationships are best forged, and not when two countries jockey from positions of strength.
It is true, the Russian economy might very well be in a downward spiral. Over the past week, more particulars surfaced about Russian banks seeking restructuring of over $400 billion of foreign debt. These reports have led some to believe that not only is the Russian financial industry becoming completely insolvent; but also, that Russia’s entire future might hang in the balance as its ruble caves in. However, there are quite a few reasons why Geopolitical Thoughts does not believe Russia’s long-term prospects are nearly as bleak as some are predicting. First and foremost, more so than any other G-8 nation, Russia’s strength is based upon crude oil. And Russia is not taking a backseat to the issue. As T. Boone Pickens pointed out in the fall, while Russia usually sends a singular individual as its envoy to OPEC meetings, they sent 22 to a fall meeting. To further Mr. Pickens’ point, it is safe to assume Russia will be lock-step with Saudi Arabia going forward to influence OPEC outcomes. Putin might be viewed as ruthless, but he is not stupid. While no one in the public markets predicted a crude oil price collapse from high $140 per barrel in June 2008 to it’s current sub-$40 prices. Yet the supply-demand dynamics favor a long-term over-$60 per barrel pricing (even with the worst economic backdrop in modern times, 12-month forward crude is pricing above $50 per barrel and January ’11 crude is above $60 per barrel.) In fact, many – Boone Pickens included – foresee a very real scenario unfolding that pushes crude back above $100 per barrel in the not-so-distant future. With any snap-back in commodity pricing, a vast majority of Russia’s ills disappears. Furthermore, Russia’s fiscal position is not nearly as debilitating as other nations have seen. It is a country with cash reserves of over $400 billion and government debt of under $200 billion. Even with a weak currency, Russia remains relatively strong, both regionally and globally.
For the time being Russia is facing real and serious economic risks. And while Geopolitical Thoughts feels they are more than likely to return to economic strength faster than most other nations, this near-term weakness is precisely the time the United States should move forward with an open hand. Fortunately, over this weekend the first diplomatic overtures were thrust forward as Russia and the U.S. are negotiating bi-lateral efforts against the Taliban. However, the goal of U.S. foreign policy goals towards Russia should not be a quid-pro-quo effort. Instead, the U.S. should become a champion for Russia. While it is unlikely Russia will ever be an ally to the U.S., they might present a counter-balance in the region, should the U.S. need one down the road.
In summary, while Geopolitical Thoughts does not support the idea of a return to a bi-polar world reminiscent of the Soviet era, a regionally-strong Russia with better U.S. relations is a foreign policy goal that is worth the effort. It is Geopolitical Thoughts belief that Russia’s current economic woes are likely to correct themselves with any rebound in the commodity price of crude oil. In the meantime, the U.S. should take advantage of a relatively-weakened nation with support for relieving private Russian bank obligations internationally to build longer-term relations with this past rival. By making overt diplomatic attempts to show respect to this sleeping bear through this and other means, the U.S. is creating a possible chip for future poker games. In other words, to mollify the Cliché Gods one final time, when it comes to Russia, “Can’t live with ‘em; can’t live without ‘em.”
Geopolitical Thoughts readily admits that Russia and its leadership are not the best bedmates for the U.S. to seek. In fact, as more and more details slip through Russia’s own form of censorship, it is clear that Vladimir Putin is not an ordinary head of state. As has recently been seen with the terrifying stories related to the slain former body guard for the Chechnyan President, Akhmad Kadyrov (amongst countless other citations: 1, 2, 3), Putin appears fairly involved with violent retaliation against anyone that crosses him or his proxies. Considering these accusations, it begs the question to ask why support the leadership of an individual who appears more and more authoritarian than democratic? The answer is two-fold. The first comes in the form of a classic idiom, “Better the devil you know than the devil you don’t”. The second comes from a famous quote by Sun Tzu, “Keep you friends close and your enemies closer.”
Supporting the removal of Putin and his gang by stating “The devil you know…” might seem clichéd. However, like Saddam Hussein and the form of secular dictatorship he demonstrated, the U.S. must consider the devil that is known versus the devil that is unknown. This was a classic mistake made by the Cheney-Wolfowitz NeoCon-led efforts in 2003. While it is hard to predict if a collapse of leadership in Russia would create a genocidal, civil war like that which was witnessed in Iraq, it is still imprudent to believe the resulting power void would spawn an improved form of governance. In fact, it is curious to see the lost irony of recent articles highlighting demonstrations in Russia against the current leadership. Instead of groups promoting democratic reform, many of the protests are actually to push Russia back to Soviet Union-era communism. It is with that backdrop that Geopolitical Thoughts considers it hasty to assume a failed-state Russia or a political-coup of current leadership would result in an improved situation for U.S. interests or regional stability.
As for Sun Tzu’s theories from his timeless “The Art of War”, there are two reasons to apply his famous rule regarding friends, enemies, and proximities. The first reason is because Geopolitical Thoughts does not equate the Russian fiscal crisis as being the same as the long-term implications of crisis’s for most EU nations. Secondly, it is in these times of perceived need that long-term relationships are best forged, and not when two countries jockey from positions of strength.
It is true, the Russian economy might very well be in a downward spiral. Over the past week, more particulars surfaced about Russian banks seeking restructuring of over $400 billion of foreign debt. These reports have led some to believe that not only is the Russian financial industry becoming completely insolvent; but also, that Russia’s entire future might hang in the balance as its ruble caves in. However, there are quite a few reasons why Geopolitical Thoughts does not believe Russia’s long-term prospects are nearly as bleak as some are predicting. First and foremost, more so than any other G-8 nation, Russia’s strength is based upon crude oil. And Russia is not taking a backseat to the issue. As T. Boone Pickens pointed out in the fall, while Russia usually sends a singular individual as its envoy to OPEC meetings, they sent 22 to a fall meeting. To further Mr. Pickens’ point, it is safe to assume Russia will be lock-step with Saudi Arabia going forward to influence OPEC outcomes. Putin might be viewed as ruthless, but he is not stupid. While no one in the public markets predicted a crude oil price collapse from high $140 per barrel in June 2008 to it’s current sub-$40 prices. Yet the supply-demand dynamics favor a long-term over-$60 per barrel pricing (even with the worst economic backdrop in modern times, 12-month forward crude is pricing above $50 per barrel and January ’11 crude is above $60 per barrel.) In fact, many – Boone Pickens included – foresee a very real scenario unfolding that pushes crude back above $100 per barrel in the not-so-distant future. With any snap-back in commodity pricing, a vast majority of Russia’s ills disappears. Furthermore, Russia’s fiscal position is not nearly as debilitating as other nations have seen. It is a country with cash reserves of over $400 billion and government debt of under $200 billion. Even with a weak currency, Russia remains relatively strong, both regionally and globally.
For the time being Russia is facing real and serious economic risks. And while Geopolitical Thoughts feels they are more than likely to return to economic strength faster than most other nations, this near-term weakness is precisely the time the United States should move forward with an open hand. Fortunately, over this weekend the first diplomatic overtures were thrust forward as Russia and the U.S. are negotiating bi-lateral efforts against the Taliban. However, the goal of U.S. foreign policy goals towards Russia should not be a quid-pro-quo effort. Instead, the U.S. should become a champion for Russia. While it is unlikely Russia will ever be an ally to the U.S., they might present a counter-balance in the region, should the U.S. need one down the road.
In summary, while Geopolitical Thoughts does not support the idea of a return to a bi-polar world reminiscent of the Soviet era, a regionally-strong Russia with better U.S. relations is a foreign policy goal that is worth the effort. It is Geopolitical Thoughts belief that Russia’s current economic woes are likely to correct themselves with any rebound in the commodity price of crude oil. In the meantime, the U.S. should take advantage of a relatively-weakened nation with support for relieving private Russian bank obligations internationally to build longer-term relations with this past rival. By making overt diplomatic attempts to show respect to this sleeping bear through this and other means, the U.S. is creating a possible chip for future poker games. In other words, to mollify the Cliché Gods one final time, when it comes to Russia, “Can’t live with ‘em; can’t live without ‘em.”
Monday, January 5, 2009
Piracy’s Long Tentacles
Many of the items that shocked the international system in 2008 are quickly fading into the past. The November U.S. elections and the global economic meltdown have put events such as Russia’s invasion of South Ossetia in the rear view mirror. Even the terrorist attacks in Mumbai are now focused on the tension between India and Pakistan instead of the actual implications of the attacks themselves. Yet each of these stories needs to be further discussed and integrated into foreign policy agendas and defense posturing.
Piracy’s Long Arm
One such item that has become a case study instead of a wake-up call for military planners was the Somali pirate attacks. On a stand-alone basis, the issue appears to have been thoroughly addressed. China has taken a hard-line approach. The U.S. is now implementing drones to monitor and respond to any action. In fact, the international response to the region has been so swift that even Japan altered it’s 50-year-plus position regarding use of Naval force to get involved. However, the reason for integrating piracy into state and defense lexicon does not lie in the events of 2008, but as part of the bigger issue about force protection.
While Geopolitical Thoughts applauds the efforts of the Armed Forces Journal for its detailed discussion of the subject, the broader issue continues to be overlooked. Namely, how is the U.S. modifying Naval tactics to counter small-ship efforts against Naval fleet and merchant marine operations during combat operations? Piracy is just one variable to this problem.
The Origins of a Problem
The concept that a small group of pirates could seize a crude tanker or luxury cruise seemed quite unlikely two years ago. For many policy analysts, such an event would be considered a long-tail event (referring to the statistical unlikelihood in the third- and fourth-standard deviation on a standard bell curve). However, these sort of statistically-unlikely events are precisely what must be addressed in an increased terrorism environment.
Geopolitical Thoughts has been monitoring such long-tail events with concern since 2002. (In reality, 9/11 was a long-tail event, but to say the U.S. has over-corrected regarding safeguards against 9/11-esque attacks is an understatement and not the point of this discussion.) In the fall of 2002, a shocking event occurred during a benign war game that reveals one of the Navy’s greatest Achilles heels: swarm tactics.
In the run-up to the Iraqi invasion, the U.S. military was going through standard war simulations. However, a retired Marine general who had long seen the weakness of the war games and Naval tactics chose to stir the pot. By injecting a simple wrinkle while playing the opposition force, General Van Riper, essentially brought the war game to its knees. As retold in a smattering of news reports, “as commander of a low-tech, third-world army, Gen Van Riper appeared to have repeatedly outwitted US forces. He sent orders with motorcycle couriers to evade sophisticated electronic eavesdropping equipment. When the U.S. fleet sailed into the Gulf, he instructed his small boats and planes to move around in apparently aimless circles before launching a surprise attack which sank a substantial part of the U.S. Navy.”
By 2003, the story of this event was quickly overshadowed by U.S. actions on the ground – in the real world. However, a year ago an event happened that quickly pushed this memory to the forefront. Using similar swam tactics, five Iranian boats “harassed” U.S. Navy ships in startlingly-effective methods. As General Van Riper told the N.Y. Times following the Iranian episode, “the sheer numbers involved overloaded their ability…”
The Significance of the Problem
The U.S. Navy speaks to the swarm tactics as an ongoing examination for lessons-learned. Similarly, the U.S. continues to bow its back aggressively against acts of piracy. However, both cases demonstrate the ability of small, fast-moving opposition to cause major impact on naval operations. Not only is it alarming that both have been proven beyond the concept-phase; but also, it is frustrating that both have been largely ignored by the U.S. military as part of tactical doctrine.
Furthermore, these real-world lessons are a component of the downside to force transformation (a subject that needs to be reconsidered in broader detail.) Transformation has been a popular phrase since before 9/11. Former-Chief of Staff of the Army Eric Shinseki was using it long before Rumsfeld. But Rumsfeld took it to a higher level. Rumsfeld didn’t just embrace the phrase, but actually created an Office of Force Transformation. While these efforts have merit, they also have their downside. One of these shortcomings is an increased burden on civilian lift capacity to meet logistical demands for troop and equipment movement.
It might be easy to address piracy today. The Army and, to a lesser degree the Air Force, may be occupied with ground operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Yet the Navy has been sitting relatively idle for some time. For the time being, the Navy can dedicate significant time and attention to a problem that seems easily containable with a few drones and joint efforts with coalition forces.
Similarly, the swam tactic threats highlighted from the 2002 episode with Iranian boats might seem small today. The Navy acknowledges the issue, which at least is a start. There is no media attention to it, nor does it seem to be a priority in the halls of the Pentagon. However, it is precisely these long-tail events that can create the most catastrophic results for U.S. forces – especially should the U.S. Navy become more occupied with easier-to-see problems.
Summary
The U.S. must begin to address issues in the nascent form instead of reacting to an issue only after it has become an internationally-acknowledged problem. It is easy to dismiss the piracy issues over the past year as isolated. To be sure, Geopolitical Thoughts does not seek to makes a habit of ringing the alarmist bell. However, this publication firmly believes that these issues are not garnering enough attention due to their larger implications of force security and naval policies.
Piracy’s Long Arm
One such item that has become a case study instead of a wake-up call for military planners was the Somali pirate attacks. On a stand-alone basis, the issue appears to have been thoroughly addressed. China has taken a hard-line approach. The U.S. is now implementing drones to monitor and respond to any action. In fact, the international response to the region has been so swift that even Japan altered it’s 50-year-plus position regarding use of Naval force to get involved. However, the reason for integrating piracy into state and defense lexicon does not lie in the events of 2008, but as part of the bigger issue about force protection.
While Geopolitical Thoughts applauds the efforts of the Armed Forces Journal for its detailed discussion of the subject, the broader issue continues to be overlooked. Namely, how is the U.S. modifying Naval tactics to counter small-ship efforts against Naval fleet and merchant marine operations during combat operations? Piracy is just one variable to this problem.
The Origins of a Problem
The concept that a small group of pirates could seize a crude tanker or luxury cruise seemed quite unlikely two years ago. For many policy analysts, such an event would be considered a long-tail event (referring to the statistical unlikelihood in the third- and fourth-standard deviation on a standard bell curve). However, these sort of statistically-unlikely events are precisely what must be addressed in an increased terrorism environment.
Geopolitical Thoughts has been monitoring such long-tail events with concern since 2002. (In reality, 9/11 was a long-tail event, but to say the U.S. has over-corrected regarding safeguards against 9/11-esque attacks is an understatement and not the point of this discussion.) In the fall of 2002, a shocking event occurred during a benign war game that reveals one of the Navy’s greatest Achilles heels: swarm tactics.
In the run-up to the Iraqi invasion, the U.S. military was going through standard war simulations. However, a retired Marine general who had long seen the weakness of the war games and Naval tactics chose to stir the pot. By injecting a simple wrinkle while playing the opposition force, General Van Riper, essentially brought the war game to its knees. As retold in a smattering of news reports, “as commander of a low-tech, third-world army, Gen Van Riper appeared to have repeatedly outwitted US forces. He sent orders with motorcycle couriers to evade sophisticated electronic eavesdropping equipment. When the U.S. fleet sailed into the Gulf, he instructed his small boats and planes to move around in apparently aimless circles before launching a surprise attack which sank a substantial part of the U.S. Navy.”
By 2003, the story of this event was quickly overshadowed by U.S. actions on the ground – in the real world. However, a year ago an event happened that quickly pushed this memory to the forefront. Using similar swam tactics, five Iranian boats “harassed” U.S. Navy ships in startlingly-effective methods. As General Van Riper told the N.Y. Times following the Iranian episode, “the sheer numbers involved overloaded their ability…”
The Significance of the Problem
The U.S. Navy speaks to the swarm tactics as an ongoing examination for lessons-learned. Similarly, the U.S. continues to bow its back aggressively against acts of piracy. However, both cases demonstrate the ability of small, fast-moving opposition to cause major impact on naval operations. Not only is it alarming that both have been proven beyond the concept-phase; but also, it is frustrating that both have been largely ignored by the U.S. military as part of tactical doctrine.
Furthermore, these real-world lessons are a component of the downside to force transformation (a subject that needs to be reconsidered in broader detail.) Transformation has been a popular phrase since before 9/11. Former-Chief of Staff of the Army Eric Shinseki was using it long before Rumsfeld. But Rumsfeld took it to a higher level. Rumsfeld didn’t just embrace the phrase, but actually created an Office of Force Transformation. While these efforts have merit, they also have their downside. One of these shortcomings is an increased burden on civilian lift capacity to meet logistical demands for troop and equipment movement.
It might be easy to address piracy today. The Army and, to a lesser degree the Air Force, may be occupied with ground operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Yet the Navy has been sitting relatively idle for some time. For the time being, the Navy can dedicate significant time and attention to a problem that seems easily containable with a few drones and joint efforts with coalition forces.
Similarly, the swam tactic threats highlighted from the 2002 episode with Iranian boats might seem small today. The Navy acknowledges the issue, which at least is a start. There is no media attention to it, nor does it seem to be a priority in the halls of the Pentagon. However, it is precisely these long-tail events that can create the most catastrophic results for U.S. forces – especially should the U.S. Navy become more occupied with easier-to-see problems.
Summary
The U.S. must begin to address issues in the nascent form instead of reacting to an issue only after it has become an internationally-acknowledged problem. It is easy to dismiss the piracy issues over the past year as isolated. To be sure, Geopolitical Thoughts does not seek to makes a habit of ringing the alarmist bell. However, this publication firmly believes that these issues are not garnering enough attention due to their larger implications of force security and naval policies.
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