A Subtle Shift in Foreign Policy?

It is fair to state that the diminished influence of Neoconservatives on U.S. foreign policy has indeed occurred after reading the U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates' comments this past week to the British strategic studies group, Oxford Analytica.

Gates has already shown an aversion to the Cheny/Wolfowitz form of foreign policy. Almost immediately after taking the reins at the Pentagon, Gates influenced the decision for the Iraq troop surge, a not-so-subtle indictment of the established paradigm. Instead of ignoring the importance of NATO and the UN for nation building, Gates has shown a pragmatic stance towards embracing these organizations. He remains open to new lines of thinking regarding Iraq, Iran, and North Korea.

It is not the SecDef's job to craft foreign policy. However, it appears that the Bush Administration is in more and more of a lame-duck mode leaving more responsibilities to others. This is partly evidenced by the starring role, and near-complete control, that has been given to Treasury Secretary Paulson throughout the September financial crisis. A less-noticeable hand-off has happened for a longer duration at the Pentagon where Gates is taking less daily directive from the White House. This influence at the agency level is significant because as Inauguration Day approaches, the subtle effects of these policy shifts will have lasting effects well beyond January.

Make no mistake, Gates remains an appointee of the President. As such, he does not make remarks that conflict with certain politically-sensitive subject matters. However, Gates is putting his stamp on the direction of U.S. military involvement globally; and it appears that his stamp is from a softer ideological ink pad. A well-articulated foreign policy must embrace the nuances of geopolitics with a big, Teddy Roosevelt stick. In other words, just as Chamberlain-level appeasement should not be considered an adequate Foreign Policy, neither should an Irving Kristol-level of preemptive use of force. Gates clearly understands this. At the Oxford Analytica event Mr. Gates articulated that the U.S. foreign policy goal should be, “to balance restraint in international affairs with the resolve and will to back up our commitments and defend our interests when called upon.” Geopolitical Thoughts hopes that the next administration embraces this balanced, gradated approach to international affairs.

Clowns to the Left of me, Jokers to the Right...

...and with apologies to Stealers Wheel... here we are, stuck in the middle. There have been some startling events this past summer that continue to point towards a rapidly-developing second Cold War.

We have all watched Hugo Chavez these past few years with a mixture of confusion and amusement. (Anyone who's attended the annual Offshore Technology Conference to see PDVSA's booth can agree with the latter.) But if history has taught us anything, one of the emotions we shouldn't ignore is concern. In late August, Iran and Venezuela formed a formal partnership. This is much more than just two of the world's wackiest leaders sharing tea. There are the obvious implications to the world energy complex. There are the more subtle possibilities should Russia, Iran, and Venezuela continue to make overt displays of power together. And then there is the downright scary implications of terrorism increasing in the U.S.'s backyard.

The LA Times confirmed that American officials believe Hezbollah is already making preparations to establish operations in Venezuela. As William Falk points out, "The group intends to create a special terrorist cell to kidnap Jewish businessmen in Latin America and take them back to Lebanon, the intelligence officials said. Another danger, they say, is that Hezbollah could use Venezuela as a base from which to insert terrorists into the United States." This news should have been more widely reported, but it happened during a time span dominated by news of the DNC, hurricane evacuations, and the RNC.

Venezuela's actions won't be ignored by DOD, the NSA, or the CIA. However, there are only so many things the U.S. can do unilaterally. The current U.S. foreign policy, in part, has been held together by the U.S.'s ability to have troops in direct contact with Al-Sadr-led Hezbollah efforts in Iraq. What happens to the foundation of this policy if Hezbollah successfully transfers their operations to a nation the U.S. has absolutely no ability to influence through military threat?

Georgia in a vacuum

The U.S. media has been giving adequate attention to the increasing U.S. response to Russia's actions in Georgia. However, there has been a surprising amount of events that have received little mainstream media attention stateside. In fact, aside from an occasional blurb, a major point that is being overlooked is the support Russia is getting for its actions in Georgia. This is not to say that Russia's support is from the likes of the U.K. or Japan, but it is to say that Russia is doing spin-control of its own to help legitimize their actions. The more Russia can create an appearance of legitimization on the international stage, the easier it will be for Russia to complicate any efforts the U.S. may try to employ in diplomatic circles such as enlarging NATO. This may seem like a feeble maneuver, yet it is another step in Russia's strategy for regional superiority and influence. Worse, this is another step in the burgeoning Second Cold War (more on that later). The Georgia actions are not in a vacuum. The Bush Administration may know this, but the U.S. media isn't giving this aspect of the situation enough attention by exploring the bigger implications.

US Foreign Policy and the NeoCon Platform

Russia's President, Dmitry Medvedev, once again stunned Western nations with the announcement that Russia now recognizes Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent regions. This news is unnerving for a myriad of reasons; the most obvious being that the rules of international law are being destroyed in part because a country has shown it can invade a sovereign nation without consequence. It is also equally obvious and equally unnerving that a country (a G-8 member, no less) can recognize regions within a different nation's borders as independent. However, a more nuanced reason this is unnerving is the bigger picture this paints in regards to a Second Cold War and the U.S.'s current approach to addressing it. Along this theme, the BBC had a fascinating interview with Georgian President, Mikheil Saakashvili. (Watch the interview.) As Saakashvili adroitly points out, this is much bigger than a regional issue. This is a nation [Russia] unilaterally trying to redraw the European map. These actions are nothing short of the first deliberate steps towards a new Cold War of ideals. Thus, if the U.S. is, in fact, entering (or already has entered) a Second Cold War, then analyzing the U.S.'s foreign policy platform is as important now as it has been since the end of the original Cold War. For the duration of the Bush Administration, the United States has adhered to a NeoCon-based foreign policy. For years a debate had raged in Washington over the academic validity of a NeoCon strategy to world issues. It is well documented that Cheney and Wolfowitz, among others, believed that intervention would lead to a domino effect of democracy. (For the full-blown edict on this concept, read The Project for the New American Century treatise entitled Rebuilding America's Defenses: Strategies, Forces, and Resources For a New Century.) Even though the debate over the NeoCon movement faded in public circles after the failed efforts in Iraq, it has not in the White House. The Bush Administration continues to speak in NeoCon tones, and still pushes these concepts as the best strategy. A pillar to the NeoCon belief is that once a country has become a part of the capitalistic society, it has too much at stake to risk alienation by other trading partners by using military force or aggression. Essentially, it is the belief that greed triumphs all. However, we are witnessing the double-edged sword of greed; i.e., capitalism. While the promise of wealth through capitalism can push communistic nations into ruins like we saw at the end of the U.S.S.R.; it is being exhibited that greed doesn't necessarily beat out nationalism. This is a major flaw in the NeoCon beliefs. Russia is proving, quite effectively, that a Neo-Communistic state can embrace greed while still maintaining an over-riding sense of nationalism and power. If this is true, then in one brief summer, Russia has ended the debate on the power of capitalism as a chief weapon in a NeoCon strategy. While the idea of spreading democracy is admirable and the belief in capitalism must remain a key element to all U.S. foreign policies, it is time to charter a new course for U.S. international efforts. While Geopolitical Thoughts is not calling for a return to Detente, the methods to support the NeoCon ideals have shown to be imprudent. As we embark upon a new U.S. presidency, it is vital to consider a new course in foreign policy as our foes no longer appear to be not only developing-nations of moderate size in the Middle East and SE Asia; but also, massively-populated, wealthy nations. Therefore, the next U.S. president must embrace a long-term foreign policy that addresses immediate and larger threats such as Neo-Communist Russia, as well as possible future threats such as Neo-Communist China. It is Geopolitical Thoughts belief that the U.S., heretofore, has not adequately appreciated the long-term implications of the Russian actions. Once hailed a new breed of Former-Soviet-Union leaders, Mikhail Saakashvili has been a trusted champion for U.S. interests in the region. However, political wonks in Georgia say that Saakashvili has played his cards poorly, and is now in serious jeopardy of losing power. (To listen to the BBC interview, President Saakashvili's words had a tone of resignation.) If the failed invasion of Iraq wasn't enough to shift the U.S. foreign policy away from a NeoCon platform, losing such an advocate as Saakashvili better. If not, the U.S. actions, or lack thereof, are putting the U.S. further into a position of strategic weakness for years to come.

This is Not Your Father's Soviet Union

Suddenly, it's the good ol days. All Russia, all the time. Where is Thatcher and Reagan when we need them? While it's good that the mainstream media is now focused on the pending implications of a new Russian dominance; it is also important that a modicum of understanding be applied to the subject. Yes, Russia did invade the break-away region of South Ossetia, Georgia. Yes, Russia has shown little interest in listening to the US's opinions. Yes, Russia is showing strong body language over its distaste for the Polish-US missile agreement. However, this is not your father's form of Soviet Communism, and that is important to note. The Russian actions over the past few weeks are nothing that contradict their actions over the past few years. What we are seeing out of Russia is a consistent posturing that is in accord with their new form of government: Neo-Communism. The problem is that fear can manifest itself into action. This is something that the US leadership must refrain from doing. One example of this would be Ukraine. This past weekend, reports began to surface of a growing concern about Russia's interest of next going into Ukraine. The fears within this once-Soviet-bloc nation are high. Aides to the President of Ukraine are accusing the Prime Minister, Yulia Tymoshenko, of supporting Russia's moves into Georgia and is a Russian sympathizer. Even the NY Times has jumped on the theme (http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/17/world/europe/17ukraine.html?th&emc=th). However, it is GeoPolitical Thinking's belief that a more thorough examination of the situation is warranted before we start building our modern-day nuke bunkers and rewrite Paul McCarthy's "Back in the U.S.S.R.". While GeoPolitical Thinking is not supporting Russia's invasion into South Ossetia, it was not an action in a vacuum. Russo-Georgian relationships have been strained for years, lest we forget that Georgia is one of the few former Soviet nations to deploy troops to Iraq in support of the US administration's actions. (Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili was lead to believe by the US administration that supporting the US in the Middle East would ensure support for him, if need be, against Russia. A quid pro quo that Saakashvili is finding out will only go so far.) This year, before the images of tanks rolling into South Ossetia popped up on television sets, Russia and Georgia were in tense talks over Abkhazia, a different region of Georgia that broke away before South Ossetia did.) The point is, to say that Russia invaded a defenseless nation is an overstatement and a blatant decision to ignore the broader picture. It is GeoPolitical Thinking's perspective that the new brand of Russian rule, Neo-Communism, is not interested in country-invading. That would lead Russia down the same path it knows won't work. Instead, Putin (and his surrogate, Medvedev) sees the former satellite nations as a buffer zone. By keeping these nations from being full-blown democratic, US-EU-mini-me's; strategically, Russia keeps any nation from having an easy path into Russian home soils. While the thought of a country invading Russia is silly; it is, nonetheless, a strategic mandate Russia must embrace for itself to ensure a strong national defense. Just as we would do the same if Mexico were an avenue for invasion (should those untrusting nations of Panama or Belize become hostile!), Russia must always protect its boarders as a part of a bigger strategy. (Even if this is done poorly by keeping some former satellites in disarray.) It is also important to realize that a strategy of conflicts over democracy in satellite nations doesn't necessarily mean Russia loses. It is an indirect way of maintaining regional dominance. While we must closely watch actions and comments from the Kremlin, if we begin to behave like we are fighting the U.S.S.R. and it's 1984, we are weakening our defensive posture. The US military cannot afford to do that.

Iraq, the War on Terror, & the Patraeus Report

Introduction
With the deluge of political spin surrounding the Patraeus Report, the preceding National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), and Bush's recent visit to the Middle East, there is much confusion with what this all truly means. As such, the further our involvement in Iraq the more important it becomes to step away from the fray of commentary and observe the current status in Iraq. However this review should not be done in a vacuum, but with the perspective of our long-term national security interests. Unfortunately, the subject has become so politically charged that macro thinking has become a forgotten aspect of our efforts in the Middle East. This essay is neither to justify nor condemn our policies, but an attempt to provide an academic overview of current U.S. foreign interactions in hopes to help further the discussion. Furthermore, understanding the intricacies of nation-state efforts to exercise will upon others is vital to understanding U.S. strategies. In the face of increased foreign policy complexities (the burgeoning Russo-Sino rapport, Iranian-Saudi efforts to impact Iraq outcomes, Chinese growth in blue-water naval operations, etc.) this not only is more important than ever; but also, more difficult.

Deeper Analysis: Understanding the Patraeus Report
It is helpful to understand what the Patraeus Report to Congress is and what it isn't. The Patraeus Report is as basic and simple as it appears: a status of military success, and of actions that are known as Operations Other Than War (OOTW). It is not a broader, truly long-term assessment of our ultimate goals in Iraq. Nor is it even a measuring stick in our political goals for reshaping the Middle East. Worse yet, and most important, the reports citing limited examples of progress in Iraq is not a measuring stick for our efforts in the ultimate purpose of our actions: the War on Terror. The 20,000 troop surge in Iraq has become a flash-point for political rallying. Much of General Patraeus's testimony focused on the surge, but the surge is really not what matters. There is little doubt that the surge has generated some positive outcomes. But we cannot deduce that the surge is the primary reason for reduced violence during the summer months, lest we forget that concurrent to the surge has been the freeze on the activities of Iraqi Shiite leader Muqtada al-Sadr's Mehdi Army. This has had as much impact on allowing U.S. forces in Iraq to intensify operations against al Qaeda as has the surge. As George Friedman points out, "the surge was not really about reducing violence levels or helping the Iraqi government...". The surge had more to do with our efforts to deter Iranian ambitions. Unfortunately, it is safe to say we failed in that goal. Not only were we unable to reach any accords with Iran in direct talks - something that should have received much more attention here in the US - but it can be argued we have emboldened Ahmadinejad and Rafsanjani in the process. This is why it is important to use the recent reports and testimony as a time to stop and take stock of where we are in our broader efforts.

The Bigger Picture:
The downplay of the importance of the NEI assessment and Patraeus's testimony is not an attempt to belittle the study outcomes. However, the reports are more insightful when considering it in the broader War onTerror. This is where the bigger picture is vital and helps us better frame our long-term efforts and properly absorb the flow of news reports and conflicting opinions from the Hill. In many ways, our current War on Terror has as many similarities to the non-combative Cold War than it does prior military actions. That is a reality overlooked in our constant efforts to compare the Iraq War to Vietnam. This is important to note for a few reasons. (1) This is true because the War on Terror isn't about small-levels military success. The Cold War comparison reminds us what War is - not a limited military action, but an exercise of Political Will. It is a tool to enforce National Strategy used by politicians, much like our use of Diplomacy was in the Cold War was the primary tool for four decades. (2) The ultimate success of the War on Terror will not come as the result to our military presence in Iraq, but whether or not the desire of freedom from the local population takes root. That is the very reason we eventually won the Cold War and the very reason we are at risk of never winning the War on Terror... surge or no surge. This is not to say thereisn't a deep-rooted yearning from populations the world-over for true freedoms such as those fighting for democracy in Iraq. It is because we aren't representing freedom the way we did so admirably throughout the Cold War. As Norman Podhoretz so adroitly points out in his new book, "World War IV", this action is truly a question of political will. No matter how long we commit to a surge, no victory can come without that oft-forgottencomponent of the Clauswitzian Trinity: The Will of the People. Currently,we are losing the will of our people and the will of the Iraqi. And that is not good. Another outcome from this deeper understanding of the macro is the realization that we need to exercise a greater degree of caution when interpreting newsflow. This is most notable by the attempts to handicap publicly-traded stocks of defense companies and DoD budget projections. Already, we have witnessed Wall Street analysts argue for increases in spending on large defense contractsfor end-items (MRAP's, etc) from these reports, which is a loose correlation at best. At the end of the day, our stretched force structureis not a correlation to a need for increased spend. (Believe it or not, our DoD budget is plenty bloated.) Nor is our need for improved refurbishment of major equipment something that will see improved DoD funding as a result of follow-through from these reports. This is because of what has already been stated, that the Patraeus Report and the NEI assessment is a basic tool in measuring a very limited scope of operations.

Conclusion:
There is a nearly insurmountable amount of progress that needs to be met in Iraq for any level of meaningful success. Similarly, there is an insurmountable amount of news and political spin on the subject. The result of these is an oft-misunderstood situation surrounding a limited military engagement as part of an even more-misunderstood set of national strategic goals. Hopefully, a better understanding of how to interpret this will help force better dialogue on the subject that needs to be front and center, the War on Terror, and less on the limited impact of a 20,000 troop surge. Ultimately, it should be the aim of the government to stop politicizing the minutia of our Iraqi efforts, and push towards a broader understanding of our national goals in the bigger context. That will not only help ensure more informed voters; but more importantly, drive us towards achieving the bigger goal of safe national borders and improved standing amongst ourpeers on the international stage.